8.4Leaving the Scene of an Accident Resulting in Serious Impairment of a Body Function or Death

A.Statutory Authority

“(1) The driver of a vehicle who knows or who has reason to believe that he or she has been involved in an accident upon public or private property that is open to travel by the public shall immediately stop his or her vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall remain there until the requirements of [MCL 257.619 (providing required information and rendering reasonable assistance)] are fulfilled or immediately report the accident to the nearest or most convenient police agency or officer to fulfill the requirements of MCL 257.619(a)-(b)] if there is a reasonable and honest belief that remaining at the scene will result in further harm. The stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), if the individual violates subsection (1) and the accident results in serious impairment of a body function or death, the individual is guilty of a felony . . . .

(3) If the individual violates subsection (1) following an accident caused by that individual and the accident results in the death of another individual, the individual is guilty of a felony . . . .” MCL 257.617.

“MCL 257.617(1) and MCL 257.617(3) establish crimes distinct from each other, each with its own elements, and [MCL 257.617(3)] is not a mere ‘penalty enhancement’ or ‘penalty provision.’” People v Dumback, 330 Mich App 631, 642 (2019). See Section 8.4(E) for information on death as an element of the offense.

MCL 257.619¹ requires:

“The driver of a vehicle who knows or who has reason to believe that he or she has been involved in an accident with an individual or with another vehicle that is operated or attended by another individual shall do all of the following:

(a) Give his or her name and address, and the registration number of the vehicle he or she is operating, including the name and address of the owner, to a police officer, the individual struck, or the driver or occupants of the vehicle with which he or she has collided.

(b) Exhibit his or her operator’s or chauffeur’s license to a police officer, individual struck, or the driver or occupants of the vehicle with which he or she has collided.

(c) Render to any individual injured in the accident reasonable assistance in securing medical aid or arrange for or provide transportation to any injured individual.”

B.Relevant Jury Instructions

•M Crim JI 15.14 addresses the elements of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in serious impairment of a body function.

•M Crim JI 15.14a addresses the elements of leaving the scene of an accident causing death.

“M Crim JI 15.14a directs trial courts to inform the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant both caused the accident and that the accident resulted in death.” People v Dumback, 330 Mich App 631, 647 (2019). See Section 8.4(E) for information on death as an element of the offense.

C.Criminal Penalties

If a defendant driver violates MCL 257.617(1) and the accident results in serious impairment of a body function or death, MCL 257.617(2) provides for the following penalties:

•imprisonment for not more than 5 years; or

•fine of not more than $5,000; or

•both.

If, after an accident caused by the defendant, the defendant driver violates MCL 257.617(1) and the accident results in another individual’s death, MCL 257.617(3) provides for the following penalties:

•imprisonment for not more than 15 years; or

•fine of not more than $10,000; or

•both.

D.Sanctions

Only applicable sanctions are discussed; accordingly, if a particular sanction is omitted from this section it is not applicable to this offense. The Offense Code Index for Traffic Violations published by the secretary of state and sourced from Michigan Department of State Court Manual includes a table detailing traffic offenses and applicable sanctions. The Offense Code Index for Traffic Violations is available at: http://www.michigan.gov/documents/OffenseCode_73877_7.pdf. See Section 1.41 for information on abstracting procedures.

•Six points. MCL 257.320a(1)(d). See Section 1.42 for more information on points.

•$1,000.00 driver responsibility fee for two consecutive years. MCL 257.732a(2)(a)(iv).² See Section 1.43 for more information on driver responsibility fees.

•License revocation and denial for at least one year. MCL 257.303(2)(d); MCL 257.303(4)(a)(i)-(ii). See Section 1.45 for more information on license revocation and Section 1.44 for more information on license denial.

•License revocation and denial also occur when a defendant has any combination of two or more convictions within seven years for violation of MCL 257.617 and any of the motor vehicle felonies listed at MCL 257.303(2)(b). See Section 1.45 for more information on license revocation and Section 1.44 for more information on license denial.

E.Issues

•Aiding and abetting

The Michigan Court of Appeals has recognized that “a passenger may be charged with aiding and abetting a driving offense.” People v Branch, 202 Mich App 550, 552 (1993), citing People v Hoaglin, 262 Mich 162, 172-173 (1933). In Branch, the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the principal in fleeing and eluding. Branch, 202 Mich App at 551. In Hoaglin, the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting the principal in failing to render assistance after an accident. Hoaglin, 262 Mich at 170. Hoaglin was decided on the basis of the former versions of MCL 257.617 and MCL 257.619. Further, the defendant in Hoaglin argued that because the principal was only found guilty of a misdemeanor, he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting. Hoaglin, 262 Mich at 172. The Hoaglin Court rejected that contention, and upheld the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 172-173. Thus, while not directly on point, Hoaglin suggests that it is proper to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting in violation of MCL 257.617 and MCL 257.619.

•Causation

MCL 257.617(3) “requires the prosecution to establish that the accident was ‘caused’ by the accused[.]” People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 194 (2010). In order to show causation, the prosecution must prove both factual and proximate causation. Id. “Factual causation exists if a finder of fact determines that ‘but for’ defendant’s conduct the result would not have occurred. . . . Proximate causation ‘is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability from attaching when the result of the defendant’s conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural.’” Id. at 194-195, quoting People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 418, 436 (2005). Proximate cause is not established if there is an intervening cause that supersedes the defendant’s conduct “‘such that the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken[.]’” Feezel, 486 Mich at 195, quoting Schaefer, 473 Mich at 436-437. “Whether an intervening cause supersedes a defendant’s conduct is a question of reasonable foreseeability.” Feezel, 486 Mich at 195. A victim’s ordinary negligence is not a superseding cause that severs proximate causation because ordinary negligence is reasonably foreseeable. Id. However, a victim’s gross negligence or intentional misconduct is not reasonably foreseeable and is sufficient to sever proximate causation. Id. The fact that an accident victim was driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.054 grams per 100 milliliters of blood and had tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in his blood stream was not an intervening cause that superseded the defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken where “[t]here was no evidence that [the victim] was not properly driving within his marked lane, or that [the victim’s] vehicle would not have safely passed [the] defendant if [the] defendant had not crossed the center line in front of [the victim], presenting a serious and unexpected hazard.” People v Bergman, 312 Mich App 471, 486 (2015). “Thus, there was no evidence that [the victim] did anything that contributed to the accident in a way that would establish that he was negligent or grossly negligent and by his conduct was an intervening cause of the accident.” Id. at 486 (holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence of the victim’s intoxication during the defendant’s trial for second-degree murder, OUIL causing death, and operating a vehicle with a suspended license causing death because the evidence was not relevant to causation under the facts of the case).

•Consecutive sentencing

A person may be charged with and convicted of MCL 257.617 for each death arising out of the same criminal transaction, and a court may impose consecutive sentences upon conviction. MCL 769.36(1)(a).

•Death as an element

“To support conviction under [MCL 257.617(3)], the prosecution must establish that the driver of a vehicle was involved in an accident, knew or had reason to know that the accident occurred, and did not stop or report,” as is required to support a conviction under MCL 257.617(1), “but the prosecution must also prove that the driver caused the accident and that another person died as a result of the accident.” People v Dumback, 330 Mich App 631, 642 (2019). “These additional requirements are elements of the offense because they increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed,” and the “additional requirements must be presented to and found by the jury.” Id. (alteration, quotation marks, and citation omitted).

•Intent to injure and knowledge not required

Intent to injure is not a necessary element of failing to stop and identify at the scene of a personal injury accident. People v Strickland (Ronald), 79 Mich App 454, 456 (1977). Moreover, the driver need not know or have reason to believe that an accident resulted in physical injury, death, or property damage. See 2005 PA 3 (amending MCL 257.617, MCL 257.617a, MCL 257.618, and MCL 257.619 to remove the requirement that a driver know or have reason to believe that an accident resulted in physical injury, death, or property damage).

•Meaning of accident

Where the term accident appears in criminal statutes that forbid leaving the scene of a personal injury accident, it includes intentional conduct; the cause of the accident is not a concern. People v Martinson, 161 Mich App 55, 57 (1987).

•Right against self-incrimination

A defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not implicated by requiring the defendant to comply with a statutory mandate to stop and disclose neutral information at the scene of a serious accident. People v Goodin, 257 Mich App 425, 432 (2003). The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the disclosures required of drivers involved in serious accidents do not create a significant risk of self-incrimination. Id. at 431. According to the Goodin Court:

   “[T]he disclosures of one’s name, address, vehicle-registration number, and driver’s license required by MCL 257.617 and MCL 257.619 are neutral and do not implicate a driver in criminal conduct. Moreover, MCL 257.617 is not directed at a ‘highly selective group’ or a group ‘inherently suspect of criminal activities,’ but rather is aimed at any driver involved in an accident that results in serious personal injuries or death.” Goodin, 257 Mich App at 430, citing California v Byers, 402 US 424 (1971).

•Single-vehicle accidents

The requirements of MCL 257.617 apply to single-vehicle accidents. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 659 (1999) (stating that “[b]ecause the statutory language does not specifically limit the provisions of [MCL 257.617] to accidents involving two vehicles or a vehicle and a pedestrian, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to so limit those provisions.”)

•Statutory meaning of involved in

To be involved in an accident means to be implicated in an accident or connected with an accident in a logical or substantial manner, and the defendant need not have caused the accident in order to have been involved in the accident. People v Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 97-98 (2000).

F.Related Misdemeanors

Leaving the scene of an accident resulting in personal injury, but not serious or aggravated personal injury, is a separate misdemeanor offense. MCL 257.617a.³

Leaving the scene of an accident resulting in damage to an attended vehicle is also a separate misdemeanor offense. MCL 257.618.⁴